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ABSTRACT 
This article investigates whether the inventions and works created by Artificial Intelligence 
should be patentable and copyrightable and if so, who should be assigned these rights.  This 
article uses US case law and incentive economics to answer these questions.  This article 
discusses who of the machine, its creators, owners, or operators should be assigned the rights 
to exclude others if policymakers want to promote the progress of science and useful arts.  All 
four candidates raise legal problems.  Based on current law, the users may be able to patent 
their invention but other works would fall into the public domain.  Assigning exclusion rights 
to any party distorts the incentives of the other parties.  The Intellectual Property system is mal-
adapted to deal with these intelligent machines.  Instead, these inventions and works should 
fall into the public domain.  The four candidates can use alternative business models to profit 
from the machine’s creations. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be protected by patent rights as a method and by copyright 
protection as a software.  AI interest has increased dramatically in the last 15 years.   Figure 1 
shows the evolution of the inclusion of the term “artificial intelligence” in US patent 
applications and granted patents that were applied between 2000 and 2016.  This shows that 
inventors have increasingly included the term “artificial intelligence” in their applications.  
Granted patents containing “artificial intelligence” remain relatively stable.2  This graph also 
shows that inventors have attempted to use patent to protect AIs.3  
 
Figure 1: Patents (by application year) containing the term “artificial intelligence” (Source: Google Patents) 
Artificial Intelligence has been defined in many different ways.  The researchers who 
coined the term4 focused on automated tasks, language use, neuron nets, calculations, self-
improvements, abstractions, randomness and creativity.5  Such software are more advanced 
than traditional executable programs but yet less advanced than human brain capabilities. 
This article defines AIs as machines capable of creating new patterns.  AI can create 
these new patterns through smart processes mimicking human inventiveness6 or through 
machine learning where machines access past patterns to learn from them, recognize, and 
create new patterns.7  While the two concepts differ, the difference is not germane to the present 
discussion.8   
                                               
2 The drop in granted patents post 2015 is due to the data truncation.  Data was collected from Google Patents on 
April 19, 2018. 
3 Artificial intelligence as a term could be under inclusive because it ignores patents that do not explicitly contain 
the term but protects a similar situated invention.  The term is also over inclusive because patent holders may 
include the term without covering an invention that fit the definition.  The USPTO has also a class (706 – Data 
processing: artificial intelligence), which deals with AI but it is also can be over and under inclusive. 
4 The etymology has been traced back to a research project started in 1955.  John McCarthy, et al. A proposal for 
the Dartmouth summer research project on artificial intelligence, August 31, 1955, 27 AI MAGAZINE 12 (2006).   
5 Id. at 12-14. 
6 For example, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation refers to software that are able to mimic 
fake users as “artificial intelligence ‘bots’” In re Ashley Madison Customer Data Security Breach Litig., 148 F. 
Supp. 3d 1378, 1380 (J.P.M.L. 2015)(assigning jurisdiction). 
7 For example, a patent holder describing as “us[ing] artificial intelligence to provide insight into business's data 
through the use of predictive modeling” sues for infringement an “an open-source software company that provides 
a machine learning platform” because the patent holder alleges that the “machine learning platform uses one or 
more apparatuses, methods, program products, and systems covered by the patent.”  Purepredictive, Inc., v. 
H2o.Ai, Inc., Case No. 17-cv-03049-WHO. (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
8 In the Future of A.I. Act of 2017, Congress defines (Sec. 3 H.R. 4625): 
(1) Artificial Intelligence.  The term “artificial intelligence” includes the following: 
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Based on this definition, AIs could mimic innovative or creative patterns.  In other 
words, AIs could create new knowledge in the form of inventions or works of arts.  This AIs 
created knowledge would be one step removed from the AI-creation.  This knowledge would 
be a second-generation knowledge.  This second-generation knowledge would benefit society.  
AI-created knowledge would however be under-supplied because, like all knowledge, AI-
created knowledge would be non-rival and non-excludable. 
In the current US system, knowledge creation is incentivized through an intellectual 
property (IP) system.  The IP system incentivizes knowledge9 creation by providing the 
knowledge creator with a period of exclusivity.  This article investigates whether, in the United 
States, such period of exclusivity should exist for AI-created knowledge.  If so, this article 
attempts to answer who should own the IP created by AI machines.  To answer these two 
questions, this article adopts a legal point of view focusing on the US system and an economics 
points of view.  This article works backward: it answers the second question to be able to 
answer the first. 
The second question requires investigating all the entities that participate in AI-created 
knowledge.  AI-machines are evolving: they are becoming more sophisticated and coming 
closer to what the scholars who coined the term had in mind.  When creating knowledge, AI-
machines usually involve four entities: the creator, the owner, the operator, and the machine 
itself.   
These four entities usually interact in the following basic scenario.  A creator invents 
the AI-machine.  The machine may then be sold to a subsequent entity.  This subsequent entity 
is the new owner.  This new owner then may employ others entities or individuals to use the 
machine to create new knowledge.  These individuals are the machine operators.  They input 
information into the machine and direct its creative process.  In some situations, these entities 
may overlap.  For example, the creator can also be the owner and operator. 
All four participants in this second-generation creative process could claim some 
ownership to the AI-created IP.  From the legal side, this article discusses under current 
jurisprudence who has the strongest claim to the IP.  From an economic perspective, this article 
discusses how assigning IP to any entity affects the other to participate in the creative process.  
                                               
(A) Any artificial systems that perform tasks under varying and unpredictable circumstances, 
without significant human oversight, or that can learn from their experience and improve their 
performance. Such systems may be developed in computer software, physical hardware, or 
other contexts not yet contemplated. They may solve tasks requiring human-like perception, 
cognition, planning, learning, communication, or physical action. In general, the more human-
like the system within the context of its tasks, the more it can be said to use artificial intelligence. 
(B) Systems that think like humans, such as cognitive architectures and neural networks. 
(C) Systems that act like humans, such as systems that can pass the Turing test or other 
comparable test via natural language processing, knowledge representation, automated 
reasoning, and learning. 
(D) A set of techniques, including machine learning, that seek to approximate some cognitive 
task. 
(E) Systems that act rationally, such as intelligent software agents and embodied robots that 
achieve goals via perception, planning, reasoning, learning, communicating, decision making, 
and acting. 
(2) Artificial General Intelligence.  The term “artificial general intelligence” means a notional future 
artificial intelligence system that exhibits apparently intelligent behavior at least as advanced as a person 
across the range of cognitive, emotional, and social behaviors. 
(3) Narrow Artificial Intelligence.  The term “narrow artificial intelligence” means an artificial 
intelligence system that addresses specific application areas such as playing strategic games, language 
translation, self-driving vehicles, and image recognition. 
9 Knowledge is used in the broadest sense to describe any theoretical or practical understanding a subject.  
Knowledge include patentable inventions from inventors, copyrightable works of arts from authors, as well as 
facts, information, and skills that may not be protectable by the IP system. 
This paper argues that while current courts may grant some IP to the AI-operator, the default 
rule should be let AI-created IP to fall into the public domain. 
To make this argument, the article is divided in three sections.  Section 2 investigates 
the potential claims of the machine creators.  This section develops in details the reasons why 
the AI-creator should be given protection for the second-generation knowledge.  The section 
looks at what happens: (1) when a patented AI creates an invention; (2) when a copyrighted AI 
creates a work of art; (3) when a patented AI creates a work of art; (4) when a copyrighted AI 
creates an invention; (5) when a non-protected AI creates an invention; and (6) when a non-
protected AI creates a work of art. 
To avoid repetitions, section 3 looks more cursorily at the claims that AI-machine 
owners, AI-operators, and the AI itself may have over the AI-created IP.  Section 3a 
investigates the claims from AI-machine owners.  Section 3b investigates the claims from AI-
machine operators.  Section 3c investigates the claims from the AI-machines themselves. 
Section 4 discusses the strength of each claim.  Under current laws and precedents, AI-
machine operators have the strongest claim on AI-created patentable inventions but no one 
would be able to copyright AI-created works of art.  From an incentive standpoint, granting 
rights to any party has negative effects on the incentives of others to participate in the 
knowledge creation process.  This theoretical discussion cannot demonstrate that anyone has 
the least negative effect.  In fact, this effect may depend on the situation – so much so that 
letting the IP falls into the public domain may be the best solution.  The different parties would 
be incentivized to use contracting and alternative business models to profit from the AI’s 
creation. 
Ryan Abbott considered similar questions in the UK context and other jurisdictions.10  
He argues in favour of protecting computer-generated works.  He argues that the author would 
always be contentious and that protection would help incentivize the programmers behind the 
machines.  By contrast, I focus on the US and pushes the policy and economic arguments 
further and arrives at a different conclusion.  But, we both agree that more clarity is required 
in this space – whether in the US (or the UK). 
2 THE MACHINE CREATOR 
The creator of the AI machine has a strong claim to the AI-created knowledge: but-for his or 
her work, the AI would not exist and nor would the AI-created knowledge.  Therefore, 
incentivizing the AI creators should be essential for policymakers.   
The following section discusses the debate around granting rights to the machine 
creator for the AI created IP.  In the discussion, the AI-creator is assumed to not be the one 
owning or operating the AI.  Those questions are dealt with in Section 3.   
The first part of this section discusses whether machine creators should be granted 
patents over the invention created by their patented AI.  The second part of this section 
discusses whether AI-creators should be granted copyright over the works created by their 
copyrighted AI.  The third part of this section discusses whether the answer changes: (1) when 
the AI-creator patented the AI, which then creates a work of art; and (2) when the AI-creator 
copyrighted the AI, which then creates an invention.  The fourth part of this section assumes 
that the AI cannot be protected and questions whether the AI-creator could get protection for 
the second-generation knowledge. 
a. Patented AI & Second-Generation Innovations  
                                               
10 Artificial Intelligence, Big Data and Intellectual Property: Protecting Computer-Generated Works in the United 
Kingdom, Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Digital Technologies (Tanya Aplin, ed. Forthcoming 
2019) available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3064213  
AI machines are often a combination of software and hardware.  This section assumes that the 
original AI is patentable11 and patented.  At first, the second-generation innovations are 
assumed to be patentable.  This section discusses whether the AI creator should be granted 
protection for the AI-created inventions.  Then, this section discusses whether the second-
generation innovation should be patentable. 
 From a policy standpoint, the creator could argue that he or she should be efficiently 
incentivized.  The AI-creator designed its AI to generate new inventions.  These inventions 
confer benefits on society.  If the AI-creator does not internalize these benefits, she or he would 
not be efficiently incentivized to create the AI in the first place.  To ensure the creation of the 
AI, the creator must be efficiently incentivized.12 
The current IP system incentivizes bonified inventors by granting them a right to 
exclude others from using the knowledge they create.  Exclusion enables IP holders to attempt 
to collect supra-competition returns on knowledge.  Under the current IP system, AI-creators 
could argue that they should receive the right to exclude others from using the second-
generation knowledge to ensure the first-generation AI is created. 
This argument played a central role in Bowman v Monsanto.13  In this case, Monsanto 
held a patent for herbicides resistant soybean seed.14  After buying these seeds from Monsanto, 
a farmer decided to buy crops from a community grain elevator and use this grain as seeds for 
his following harvest.15  The grain from the community elevator were mostly soybean with the 
patented trait because most farmers in the area used Monsanto seeds as well.16  The US 
Supreme Court ruled that the farmers could not use the soybean from the community grain and 
raise them as crops because it amounted to a replication of the patented technology.17 
                                               
11 Some inventors face uphill battles to prove innovativeness in an attempt to cast a broad net.  For example, in 
Blue Spike, LLC v. Google Inc., patents were invalidated because they attempted to claim protection for a method 
of signal recognition, which were considered abstract ideas and lack inventive concept.  Google argued that signal 
comparison mirrors human perception and such a patent would block future breakthrough in artificial intelligence.  
2015 WL 5260506 (N.D. Cal. 2015) affirmed per curiam No. 2016-1054. Fed. Cir. (2016) cert’ denied 137 S.Ct. 
2246 (2017).  In some cases, the AI-type research tools may not  even be granted protection because they are just 
a research starting point.  In re Fisher, 421 F. 3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) the USPTO refuse to grant a patent because 
the claim asserted are “starting points for further research.”  Id. at 1370.  The patent amounts to a tool of unknown 
use without clear function and the invention has “not been researched and understood to the point of providing an 
immediate, well-defined, real world benefit to the public meriting the grant of a patent.” Id. at 1376.  In other 
words, the patent applicant attempted to patent a research area.  “[A] patent is not a hunting license. It is not a 
reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion. [A] patent system must be related to the 
world of commerce rather than to the realm of philosophy.” Id. at 1375-76 quoting Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 
519, 535-536 (1966).  Extrapolating to AI, its creator invented a tool that can be used for research.  As an abstract 
research tool, this creator cannot gain protection over the research tool and its progeny or the area of research.  
Some have already discussed whether such AI could be patentable.  See e.g., Peter M. Kohlhepp, When the 
Invention Is an Inventor: Revitalizing Patentable Subject Matter to Exclude Unpredictable Processes, 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 779 (2008). 
12 Incentives can take many forms.  The discussion in this section focuses on the IP system create incentives 
through the right to excludes.  However, policymakers have used other system to incentives innovators.  For 
example, in the UK, the Parliament passed The Longitude Act of 1714.  This Act created a monetary reward for 
the inventors that came up with a device that would help sailors estimate the longitude of their ships.  See e.g., M. 
Diane Burton & Tom Nicholas, Prizes, patents and the search for longitude, 64 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HISTORY 
21 (2017)(discussing the innovation impact of the Act).  Inducement prizes can even be used as a complementary 
incentive to the patent system to direct innovation without depriving innovators of their patent rights. See e.g. 
Liam Brunt, Josh Lerner & Tom Nicholas. Inducement prizes and innovation. 60 J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 657 
(2012)(find that prizes impact patenting behavior and can help target technology sectors). 
13 133 S.Ct. 1761 (2013) 
14 Id. at 1764. 
15 Id. at 1765. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 1768-69. 
The Court argued that if the patent holder cannot control the use of second-generation 
seeds, the farmers who purchased the first-generation seed from Monsanto would then be free 
to sell their crop as seeds.  Monsanto would have to compete with second-generation seeds.  
“[I]f simple copying were a protected use, a patent would plummet in value after the first sale 
of the first item containing the invention.”18  To counterbalance this second-generation price 
drop, Monsanto would have to increase the price for the first-generation and price out farmers 
from purchasing the patented seed.  Furthermore, the US Supreme Court also argued that the 
technology in Bowman was self-replicating.19  Planting and raising new crops amount to 
unlawfully duplicating the original technology. 
Bowman creates a precedent that supports an AI-creator’s claim to future AI-created 
IP.  Like plants, AI machines can self-replicate and self-improve.20  If the Court applied the 
Bowman logic to AI machines, it could extend the patent rights from the original AI to its 
progeny, the second-generation AIs.  Without such guarantees, the AI-creator would compete 
with its consumers in the AI market.  Without such guarantees, AI creator would not create the 
original AI because s/he would be under-incentivized to create an AI. 
The AI creator may decide to respond to a lack of guarantees by increasing the price of 
the original AI.  The AI creator would have to encompass the value of future knowledge and 
improved AIs when pricing its first sale.  The AI creator may price out any potential buyers.  
If the price increased without eliminating demand, the demand could be so small that AI 
creators could not reach the economies of scale necessary to justify the initial investment.  
Without these economies of scale, the AI creators may not profit and hence may never invent 
the AI.21 
Following Bowman, US courts could interpret the Constitutional intent behind the 
Patent and Copyright clause to mean that an AI-creator should be granted rights over AI-
created IP “to promote the progress of science and useful arts.” 22  The easier approach would 
be to change the legislation: if policymakers found that AIs provide socially beneficial services, 
then they may wish to let AI-creators control and benefit from the AI’s progeny. 
Bowman focuses on the original product market competition.23 AIs could however 
invent in unrelated fields.  Even if the inventions were in different fields, the argument to grant 
the creator protection over the second-generation knowledge remains unchanged.  Faced with 
the question, the US Supreme Court may decide that if the AI creator is not granted control 
over the AI-created IP, then it may not be efficiently incentivized to create the original AI or 
                                               
18 133 S.Ct. at 1767-68. 
19 Id. 
20 “Probably a truly intelligent machine will carry out activities which may best be described as self-improvement. 
Some schemes for doing this have been proposed and are worth further study. It seems likely that this question 
can be studied abstractly as well.”  John McCarthy, Marvin L. Minsky, Nathaniel Rochester, and Claude E. 
Shannon. (1955). A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence, available at 
http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/history/dartmouth/dartmouth.html or in 27 AI MAG. 12 (2006). 
21 Economies of scale play a central role in software like AI.  Software involve large fixed cost (i.e., the Research 
and Development) and low marginal cost (i.e., the costs of copying a software).  To be profitable, goods with 
large fixed cost and low variable costs must be sold at large volume to be privately optimal to develop.  Rajiv D. 
Banker, & Chris F. Kemerer, Scale economies in new software development, 15 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON 
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 1199 (1989)(finding when economies of scales occur in new software development).  
Beside economies of scale based on volume, software inventors also benefit from other volume-based externalities 
such as network.  Network externalities may increase the AI user’s willing to pay a premium; but the price increase 
remains a concern. 
22 Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution.  Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 (capitalization omitted). 
23 The cannibalisation of the primary market by the secondary market is known as the Coase Conjecture attributed 
to Ronald Coase who first discussed this issue in Ronald H. Coase, Durability and monopoly, 15 J. L. & ECON. 
143 (1972). 
may price out any potential buyers.  This incentive problem is the direct effect of granting AI 
creator control of the AI’s work product: the effect on willingness-to-sell. 
Such an argument faces two legal counter-arguments: the patent exhaustion doctrine 
and claim limitations.  Both arguments have their root in decreasing transaction costs for 
subsequent transactions and subsequent inventors. 
First, the patent exhaustion doctrine could limit how AI creators control the machine 
work product.  The patent exhaustion doctrine states that “[w]hen a patentee sells an item, that 
product ‘is no longer within the limits of the [patent] monopoly’ and instead becomes the 
‘private, individual property’ of the purchaser.”24  The US Supreme Court adopted this doctrine 
because it feared that a system where a right holder could control the IP and its use once the 
embodiment was sold would impede commerce.25  In other words, it would increase transaction 
costs in the IP market. 
In the AI case, the US Supreme Court may fear that granting creators control over the 
second-generation IP would destroy the market for AI.  If consumers cannot exploit the AI’s 
work product because it belonged to the original IP holder, then few (or no) consumers would 
be willing to purchase such machine.  This limited market for the AI would not sufficiently 
incentivize innovators to create the original AI.  This incentive problem is the indirect effect of 
granting AI-creator control of the AI’s work product: the effect on willingness-to-pay. 
The seeds in Bowman did not raise the same problem because the progeny had other 
uses (i.e. end-consumer consumption).  Bowman stands as the glaring exception to the long 
history of the patent exhaustion doctrine26 so much so that the US Supreme Court limited its 
application.  The Court affirmed in Bowman that “[o]ur holding today is limited — addressing 
the situation before us, rather than every one involving a self-replicating product.”27  Therefore, 
the US Supreme Court may not expend the ruling to AI machine. 
Other cases support that the US Supreme Court may not extend the Bowman ruling to 
the AIs’ progeny.  Instead, the Court may decide to reinforce the patent exhaustion doctrine. 
AI machines are software protected by method patents.28  The US Supreme Court rules on the 
replication of such a method in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.29  In this case, 
LG held a patent that it licensed to Intel.30  Intel made chips that embodied the patented 
methods.31  Quanta purchased the Intel chips and combined them with other chips where the 
whole system implemented LG’s patented methods.32  LG claimed that Quanta infringed on its 
patent because the non-licensed chips embodied the patented method.33  The US Supreme 
Court ruled that the patent exhaustion doctrine applied to business methods.  “The authorized 
                                               
24 Impression Products v. Lexmark International, 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1526 (2017). 
25 Chief Justice Roberts traces its origin to 1628 England.   Impression Products v. Lexmark International, 137 S. 
Ct. 1523, 1526 (2017). (stating that Lord Coke wrote that “if an owner restricts the resale or use of an item after 
selling it, that restriction ‘is voide, because... it is against Trade and Traffique, and bargaining and contracting 
betweene man and man.’”)  Justice Thomas traces the first mention in Supreme Court cases to 1853 in Bloomer 
v. McQuewan.  Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2115 (2008)(quoting Bloomer v. 
McQuewan, 14 How. 539, 549, 14 L. Ed. 532 (1853)). 
26 In Bowman, the defendant argued that “exhaustion should apply here because seeds are meant to be planted. 
The exhaustion doctrine […] typically prevents a patentee from controlling the use of a patented product following 
an authorized sale.”  133 S.Ct. at 1768.  See e.g., Garry A. Gabison, Worldwide FRAND Licensing Standard, 8 
AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 139, 154-62 (2019)(discussing the patent exhaustion doctrine cases decided by the US 
Supreme Court). 
27 133 S.Ct. at 1769. 
28 See e.g., Blue Spike, LLC v. Google Inc., supra note 11.  
29 553 US 617 (2008). 
30 Id. at 2114. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 2114-15. 
sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder's rights and 
prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to control postsale use of the article.”34 
The US Supreme Court may be persuaded that the AI case stands closer to Quanta than 
Bowman.  In Quanta, the IP holder received a licensing fee for each machine but not each 
replication within the machine i.e. not each second-generation use of the method.  Under 
Quanta, the US Supreme Court would rule that patent rights cannot be used to control 
subsequent use of the IP – even for method patents.  Once an AI-creator legally sold its AI (or 
license its use without condition), the transaction exhausts its rights to control its use.   
The US Supreme Court would have to balance the Bowman ruling against the Quanta 
ruling.  Specifically, it would have to balance the direct effect on AI creation against the 
indirect effects on AI consumption.  The AI creators could address these issues more easily 
through licensing scheme than using patent right to control the use of AI and second-generation 
knowledge.   
Second, creators may not be able to patent the second-generation inventions for two 
reasons: (1) the claim description in the first-generation patent limits what is protected;35 and 
(2) the second-generation innovations must overcome the obviousness36 hurdle during the 
patent applications.  These criteria – among others – limit what is patentable.  The claim 
description looks at the boundaries of what is claimed whereas the second look at foreseeable 
improvements; but, in the AI context, they both limit what second-generation knowledge could 
be protected. 
Patents are public option contracts between society and the right holder.37  For the 
contract to be formed, the right holder must create an invention where the benefits to society 
outweigh the costs.  The benefits to society take the form of a new invention and advancing 
knowledge.  The costs take the form of exclusivity-induced decreased competition and 
increased prices.  Society can decide whether to take the option after learning about the 
invention’s content.38 
To advance knowledge, patents must describe and disclose the underlying invention 
“and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms.”39  In other words, patent claims must be precise and the described invention must be 
reproduceable.40  The claim descriptions must be sufficient to allow a person with ordinary 
skills in the art to repeat the process.41  These claim descriptions set the boundaries of the 
patent’s reach.42  
                                               
34 Id. at 2122. 
35 35 U.S. Code § 112. 
36 35 U.S. Code § 103. 
37 The US Supreme Court has referred to patent as “public franchise.”  Oil States Energy v. Greene's Energy 
Group, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373-74 (2018).  As such, the US Patent and Trademark office can revoke an already 
granted patent through its administrative process.  Patents are not rights akin to property right that demand a 
review from Article III courts under the Seventh Amendment. 
38 To be patentable, an invention must (1) cover a patentable subject matter (35 U.S.C. § 101) and are (2) novel 
(35 U.S.C. § 102), (3) non-obvious (35 U.S.C. § 103), and (4) useful (35 U.S.C. § 101).  With the USPTO as its 
agent, society decides whether to take the option i.e. pay the cost to receive the benefits. 
39 35 U.S. Code § 112. 
40 37 CFR 1.75. 
41 For example, Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) the Federal Circuit  judges 
disagreed whether the patent sufficiently described the space between two electrodes to measure the machine 
user’s heartrate. Id. at 2131.  The US Supreme Court remanded for further determination not before stating that a 
patent is invalid for indefiniteness “if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the 
prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the 
invention.” Id. at 2124. 
42 “Every patent is required to end with at least one claim.  Claims are single sentences in which the patentee is 
required, by statute, to particularly identify the invention over which she wants exclusivity.”  Christopher A. 
Cotropia, What is the “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855, 1865 (2012).  For example, in Phillips v. 
To gain protection based on the original AI patent, the creator would have to somehow 
sufficiently and precisely described what his or her AI were to create.  In other words, the AI 
creator would have to predict its AI’s innovation.  If he could predict its AI’s innovation, then 
it should include this language into the original AI patent.  As such, the question would become 
moot because the creator would already have a patent covering the follow-on innovation in the 
original patent. 
In most cases, the AI-creator may fail to predict what the AI would invent.  Without 
such prediction, the patent would not include sufficient and precise language in the original 
patent.   Without such language, the creator would have to write a vague patent trying to claim 
follow on innovations.  She or he would not be able to obtain a patent because it would be too 
abstract43 – even under the machine test.44 
Regardless of whether the AI creator can anticipate the AI’s work.  The invention itself 
may be unpatentable as obvious.  Patent law attempts to ensure that only socially welfare 
enhancing patents are granted.  To reach that aim, patent law proxies a cost-benefit analysis 
through four main criteria including45 obviousness.46 
Obviousness refers to advancement of knowledge.  The advancement must be sufficient 
to be patentable.  To be non-obvious, an invention cannot be anticipated by “a person having 
ordinary skill in the art” (POSITA) from known inventions.47  But any POSITA with an AI 
could input the same information into the AI and obtain the same AI-generated inventions.  So, 
the AI-generated inventions may not be considered an advancement.  The AIs themselves make 
the second-generation inventions easier to anticipate for anyone using an AI.48 
                                               
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Federal Circuit debated the scope of the patent within the 
meaning of the word “baffle” to establish the patent’s scope.  The Federal Circuit adopted the plain meaning of 
baffle and as such reversed the summary judgment of noninfringement. Id. at 1328. 
43 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)(ruling that an abstract idea does not become 
patentable because it involves a computer implementation). 
44 While AI involves a machine and as such, patent holder may find a way to patent their invention under the 
machine test.  Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)(discussing the machine-or-transformation test as one of the 
tests to determine the patentability of a method).  The ideas that AI invention may try to protect may be too 
abstract as in Blue Spike, LLC v. Google Inc., 2015 WL 5260506 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  Others have discussed whether 
artificial intelligence should be patentable See e.g., Peter M. Kohlhepp, When the Invention Is an Inventor: 
Revitalizing Patentable Subject Matter to Exclude Unpredictable Processes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 779 (2008). 
45 To be patentable,  the invention must (1) cover a patentable subject matter (35 U.S.C. § 101) and be (2) novel 
(35 U.S.C. § 101), (3) non-obvious (35 U.S.C. § 103), and (4) useful (35 U.S.C. § 101).  Those criteria are vague 
and often proxy poorly the cost-benefit analysis.  The system grants exclusivity to welfare reducing inventions 
(false positive) and denies exclusivity to welfare enhancing inventions (false negative).  AI may create both 
welfare enhancing and reducing inventions. 
46 “A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not 
identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art 
are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the 
claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability 
shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.” 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
47 In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007), Teleflex was the exclusive license for a patent 
for an electronic sensor; Teleflex claimed that KSR infringed its patent because it used a similar sensor; KSR 
claimed the infringed claim was invalid because it was obvious: it was a predictable use of the prior art.  The US 
Supreme Court ruled that the patent was obvious because it combined established prior art in a way obvious to a 
person with ordinary skill in the art. Id. at. 1742-45. 
48 See e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 339 F. 3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003)(“Anticipation does not 
require the actual creation or reduction to practice of the prior art subject matter; anticipation requires only an 
enabling disclosure.”).  AI come in a number of forms.  The most commons are artificial general intelligence and 
narrow artificial intelligence.   See definitions from the Future of A.I. Act of 2017, supra note 8.  Because narrow 
AI accomplishes a limited set of tasks, it is more likely to create a predictable invention because the creator created 
the AI for the particular purpose.  By contrast, artificial general intelligence resembles more a human intelligence 
which makes the predicting inventions more difficult. 
Furthermore, the fictional POSITA may need to be adjusted because of the existence 
of AIs.  As AI machines become more ubiquitous, the standard may need to become a “person 
having ordinary AI-enhanced skill in the art.”  Such an enhanced POSITA would mean that 
AIs could make any inventions more obvious and less likely to be patentable. 
In conclusion, patent doctrines and existing precedents weigh against granting AI-
creators rights over the AI created IP.  Economic reasoning shows that granting AI-creators 
rights over the AI created IP would incentivize AI-creators while disincentivizing AI 
purchasers and users.  The balance of incentives weigh against AI-creators as they can deploy 
other business models to profit.  The next section investigates what happens with respect to 
copyrighted AI and the copyrightability of their works of art. 
b. Copyrighted AI & Second-Generation Works  
Most AI machines have software and hardware components.  The AI software can be protected 
through copyright.  This section assumes that the original AI software is copyrighted.  It also 
assumes that the second-generation works of arts are copyrightable.  This assumption is relaxed 
below.  This section discusses whether the AI creator should be granted copyright protection 
for the AI-created works.  
 When designing copyright policy, policymakers must balance countervailing incentives 
similar to the ones generated by patent rights.  On the one hand, policymakers weigh whether 
protecting and assigning the AI-generated IP to an AI-creator is necessary to incentivize the 
creation of AIs or their market.  On the other hand, policymakers weigh whether this protection 
and assignment would dis-incentivize all consumers to purchase the AI or operators to use the 
AI to create new knowledge.  The opposing incentives create a vicious circle. 
In copyright law as in patent law, policymakers have generally favoured consumers’ 
incentives to purchase over authors’ incentives to create.  Policymakers have worried that 
extending the reach of copyright holders increase transaction costs.  These costs would impede 
more than benefit commerce.  This balance led to the creation of the first sale doctrine. 
The first sale doctrine is the copyright parallel to the patent exhaustion doctrine.49  
These two doctrines serve a similar purpose.50  Its common-law history also reaches as far back 
as the patent exhaustion doctrine.51   The first sale doctrine limits the copyright holder’s ability 
to control the goods embodying the copyrighted works.   
The Court created the first sale doctrine because it feared that, otherwise, copyright 
holders could dictate and limit what would happen to copyrighted works even once they entered 
the stream of commerce.52  Congress later codified the common law in the Copyright Act of 
1976.53  The codified doctrine specifies that “the owner of a particular copy […] lawfully made 
                                               
49 Garry A. Gabison, The First Sale Doctrine and Foreign Sales: The Economic Implications in the US Textbook 
Market, 15 UMASS L REV (Forthcoming 2019)(discussing in more details case law related to the first sale 
doctrine). 
50 “The two share a ‘strong similarity ... and identity of purpose.’” Impression Products v. Lexmark International, 
137 S. Ct. 1523, 1526 (2017) quoting Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 13(1913). 
51 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013).  Justice Breyer traces it to 1628 England.  
“In the early 17th century Lord Coke explained the common law’s refusal to permit restraints on the alienation of 
chattels … A law that permits a copyright holder to control the resale or other disposition of a chattel once sold is 
similarly ‘against Trade and Traffi[c], and bargaining and contracting.’”  The US Supreme Court precedents first 
discuss the doctrine in 1908 in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 US 339 (1908).  In this case, the copyright holder 
attempted to impose a resale price maintenance based on its copyright and ability to control the copyrighted books.  
Id. at 340.   
52 “The whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright owner places a copyrighted item in the 
stream of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its distribution.” Quality 
King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998). 
53 17 U.S.C. § 109. 
[…] is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
possession of that copy.”54 
The Congressional version of the first sale doctrine makes special mention of software.  
This version specifies how software ought to be handled.  First, the doctrine does not apply to 
software rental, lease, or lending for commercial purpose. The first-generation copyright holder 
retains its rights unless the transfer involves “a nonprofit educational institution.”55  In 
commercial context, the first sale doctrine encourage an AI-creator to use a licensing scheme 
to exercise control over the software use – but copyright law cannot be asserted to control its 
use. 
Second, a software sale does not hinder a copyright holder’s ability to control 
reproduction of the AI-software.56  This ability to control reproduction reflects the worry that 
software can be cheaply copied to compete with the original.  Copyright law provides an 
avenue for AI-creator to rein in competition from direct or autonomous reproduction. 
Right holder can also control some reproduction of second-generation knowledge.  For 
example, based on the assumed definition, an AI can self-ameliorate its code.  The first-
generation right holder can exclude others from using the AI-code that comes from the original 
software.  That portion of the code remains protected.  Thus, right holders could prevent 
second-generation AIs from being created. 
Questions remain about the portion of the code that the AI has generated.  Pushing this 
further, AIs could create works of art unrelated to the AI software.  An inventor could create 
an AI software and copyright it.  This AI could subsequently write a software, a book, a poem, 
or a symphony. For example, an AI-software can paint a picture.57  This painting may include 
some independent improvisations.58   
Copyright law provides no support to allow AI-creators to control this work of 
improvisation.  The statute states that right holders cannot control “a computer program which 
is embodied in a machine or product.”59  Congress worried about copying and not about the 
use or work product once the software-embodied in a machine was sold. 
In conclusion, policymakers – as well as courts – have favoured other business models 
such as licensing over extending copyright law.  While policymakers may not have anticipated 
the use of AI to create works of arts, they favoured a Copyright Law that enables the 
dissemination of works.  Assigning the AI-generated IP to creators would impede on the 
dissemination of their AI.  As such, policymakers would not favour such right extension. 
So far, this section assumes that the AI word product would be copyrightable and focus 
on the assignment issue.  However, this work product may not be copyrightable.60  To be a 
copyrightable a work must be original.  “The sine qua non of copyright is originality.”61  
Originality ensures that the benefits to society outweigh the costs.  As in patent protection, the 
benefits to society is the creation and dissemination of new works whereas the costs take the 
form of supra-competitive price due to right to exclude others.  Originality attempts to proxy 
this balance. 
                                               
54 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
55 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A). 
56 17 U.S.C. § 109. 
57 See e.g., Jonathan Jones, A portrait created by AI just sold for $432,000. But is it really art?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 
26, 2018) https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/shortcuts/2018/oct/26/call-that-art-can-a-computer-be-a-
painter 
58 See e.g., Nadja Sayej, Vincent van Bot: the robots turning their hand to art, GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 2016) 
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/apr/19/robot-art-competition-e-david-cloudpainter-bitpaintr 
59 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(B)(i). 
60 To be copyrightable, a work must be (1) original, (2) fixed in (3) any tangle medium of expression (17 U.S. 
Code § 102).  The discussion focuses on the first element and assume the other are satisfied. 
61 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 US 340, 345 (1991). 
 “To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author.”62  The US 
Supreme Court stated that “[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the 
work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and 
that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”63  These criteria provide more 
details proxy for courts to investigate the societal balance of interests.  First, “independently 
created” – as opposed to copied – ensures that protection is not granted to a work for which 
society already enjoys the benefits.  Granting further protection to another copy of the same 
work would generate no benefits.  Second, “minimal degree of creativity” ensure that the gap 
between current knowledge and the new knowledge is sufficient to warrant exclusivity.  In 
other words, this criterion ensures that the marginal benefit to society (additional creative work) 
outweigh the marginal cost (new protection for a work). 
In the AI context, most works would not be copyrightable.  First, AI-created IP may 
not be considered independently created.  By assumption, the AI-creator would need to involve 
an operator and the AI.  The AI-creator may not be considered the “author” and she or he would 
not be independent because it requires the help of the operator and AI – if it were to be 
considered an entity.  Whether the AI-operator or the AI itself have a claim is discussed in 
more details below in section 3. 
Second, AI-created IP may not involve a minimal degree of creativity.  Once an AI-
creator makes his or her machine, the machine can be duplicated.  Any duplicated machine 
which received the same instructions should reach a similar outcome.  Thus, the work product 
would not be unique to the machine.  Even if the machine has an element of randomness to it, 
the differences may not be substantial enough to justify granting protection i.e. the costs would 
outweigh the benefits. 
Thus, both copyright law and the aims of copyright law would not favour AI-creators 
being granted and assigned protection for their AI works of arts.  The next section discusses 
what happens when right holders try to cross protection between patent and copyright. 
c. Mixing Intellectual Property Protection 
This section looks at the next two issues with AI-created innovations and works: (1) whether 
copyright protection should be granted and assigned to AI-patent holders for the AI-created 
works;64 and (2) whether patents should be granted assigned to AI-copyright holders for the 
AI-created inventions.65  This mix protection avoid issues of foreseeability but do not foreclose 
issue of originality.  This section discusses whether AI-creator should be granted the second-
generation knowledge by discussing the aims of the IP system. 
In the US, patent right and copyright protection do not originate from common law66 
or human right.67  The IP system originates from the Constitution.  The Constitution states that 
the IP system aims “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited 
                                               
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 This question is discussion in more details in other works.  See e.g., Timothy L. Butler, Can a Computer be an 
Author – Copyright Aspects of Artificial Intelligence, 4 COMM/ENT L.S. 707 (1981). Daniel J. Gervais, The 
Machine As Author, 105 IOWA L. REV. (Forthcoming 2019). 
65 The fact that the patent was obtained through a copyright AI should not be problematic.  “Patentability shall 
not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.” 35 U.S. Code § 103. 
66 Wheaton and Donaldson v. Peters and Grigg, 33 US 591, 661 (1834). 
67 The view that copyright is part of the human right is common in other parts of the world.  For example, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author." General Assembly 
Resolution 217, Art. 27(2) (1948) available at  https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/  
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.”68  This clause has required Legislative and Judicial interpretations. 
Promoting by securing an exclusive right can take many forms.  Promoting could be 
interpreted to mean that this exclusive right should be granted when a rational AI-creator is 
efficiently incentivized.  Such incentives occur if the creator expects that its benefits outweigh 
its costs.  However, the US Supreme Court has rejected this creator-centric cost-benefit 
analysis. 
Specifically, in copyright law, the US Supreme Court has rejected the cost approach.69  
This approach was embodied in the “sweat of the brow” doctrine.  This doctrine granted 
copyright protection for works that had required efforts to create.70  The Court moved away 
from this doctrine because the Court viewed the doctrine as protecting both facts and their 
arrangements.71  The Court re-affirmed that facts were not protected and hence fact 
compilations should not be protected either – even if they were costly to create.72 
In patent law, Congress affirmed that “[p]atentability shall not be negated by the 
manner in which the invention was made.”73  According to this statute, the manner – including 
the costs – becomes irrelevant to the determination of patent protection. 
The rejection of the inventor-centric approach benefits AI-creator in protecting second-
generation knowledge.  The second-generation knowledge could receive protection even with 
minimal involvement or investment from the creator.  Thus, even if the second-generation 
knowledge was a by-product of the first-generation knowledge, AI-creator may have a claim. 
From a policy standpoint, rejecting the inventor or author-centric approach has upside 
and downsides.  On the one hand, this rejection encourages AI-creators to focus on commercial 
reward instead of social value.74  It could leave society without solutions for problems which 
cannot be solved through commercially viable models (e.g., war against peace).  In the AI-
context, it could over-incentivize creators to develop AIs that would autonomously generate 
                                               
68 Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution.  Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 (capitalization omitted). 
69 Even though the US Supreme Court has rejected it, it has also struggled with this doctrine.  In International 
News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) the Court refused to grant a copyright in the news but 
create a “quasi-property” because it recognized that without some protection, the news producer would not be 
able to recoup their cost.  “That business consists in maintaining a prompt, sure, steady, and reliable … at a price 
that … is sufficient in the aggregate to afford compensation for the cost of gathering and distributing it, with the 
added profit so necessary as an incentive to effective action in the commercial world.”  Id. at 235.  But, in Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 US 340 (1991) the plaintiff complied information into 
telephone listing database.  The defendant copied some information from the listing.  The Court rejected the sweat 
of the brow doctrine because “it extended copyright protection  … to the facts themselves.” Id. at 352-53.  
70 “Known alternatively as ‘sweat of the brow’ or ‘industrious collection,’ the underlying notion was that copyright 
was a reward for the hard work that went into compiling facts.”  Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co., 499 US at 352. 
71 The US Supreme Court stated in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 US 186 (2003), that the “sweat-of-the-brow view of 
copyright, however, was emphatically rejected by this Court in 1834 in Wheaton v. Peters.” Id. at 236.  The Court 
reasoned that copyright was not a Constitutional right but a Congressional creation.  As such, it could be removed, 
changed or amended.  Copyright was not automatic from a having expended cost.  Nonetheless, the Court 
explicitly rejected this doctrine in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. “The ‘sweat of the 
brow’ doctrine had numerous flaws, the most glaring being that it extended copyright protection in a compilation 
beyond selection and arrangement—the compiler's original contributions—to the facts themselves.”  499 US at 
352. 
72 Id. 
73 35 U.S. Code § 103. 
74 This issue has led to Congress having to carve out specific incentives when the social benefits outweigh the 
commercial benefits.  For example, Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act of 1983, which attempts to incentivize 
pharmaceutical companies through broader exclusivity (i.e. exclusivity of disease treatment instead of molecule) 
and more tax credit to create drugs for rare diseases.  See e.g., David Duffield Rohde, The Orphan Drug Act: An 
Engine of Innovation – At What Cost, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 125, 144 (2000). 
knowledge.  While this knowledge could have commercial applications, the AI-creator could 
receive protection to rent-seek e.g., anticipate competitive entry. 
On the other hand, rejecting the innovator-centric approach encourages inventors and 
authors to be efficient.  First, these individuals control development costs.  The investments 
may affect the AI’s quality.  It also affects the number of applications.  Some of these 
applications are foreseeable and others are unforeseeable.  Granting the AI-creator protection 
for foreseeable applications creates efficient incentives.  It influences the investment and 
exploitation level.  Granting the AI-creator protection for unforeseeable revenue stream would 
not incentivize the innovation.  Rejecting the inventor/author-centric approach rewards luck 
instead of investment. 
Granting protection for foreseeable and unforeseeable second-generation knowledge 
removes uncertainties about revenue apportionment.  It gives the AI-creator a better bargaining 
position when negotiating with other potential claimants.  It decreases the number of disputes 
related to authorship.  For example, if  a creator sells an AI to two different users and these 
users reach the same outcome, all claims revert to the creator without unnecessary disputes. 
However, this grant could also create more disputes.  AI could decrease innovation 
costs and decrease the leaps in innovation.  Multiple creators may try to claim protection for 
similar or close work product.  These claims could blur the boundaries between different work 
product.75  This phenomenon would increase uncertainties about the revenue stream.  AI-
creators may not be more incentivized even if they were guaranteed protection for the second-
generation knowledge because they could not anticipate those innovations (and revenue 
streams). 
Second, the AI-creators also control – to some extent – the benefits they receive.  The 
AI-creators do not need to rely on the revenue stream from second-generation knowledge 
because, by assumption, the original AI is protected from perfect competition and they control 
its pricing.  The AI creator can increase the price of the AI sale to reflect the value of the 
second-generation knowledge.  If the price raise decreases the creator’s profit, this creator can 
resort to other business models (e.g., licensing, metering, time limit, contractual royalty on 
subsequent IP).76  These models avoid releasing the AI into the stream of commerce: the creator 
                                               
75 In theory, the obviousness requirement in patent and the originality requirement in copyright should filter out 
these IP.  But, this is not always the case.  In the patent context, some patent may have overlapping claims.  See 
e.g., Georg Graevenitz, Stefan Wagner, & Dietmar Harhoff, Incidence and growth of patent thickets: The impact 
of technological opportunities and complexity, 61 J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 521 (2013)(finding that patent thicket 
occur more in complex technologies where patents cite each other more and hence when an invention requires 
more patents to be implemented).  Instead of filtering similar system, these overlaps mean that more cooperation 
becomes necessary in complex technology.  These overlaps have been referred as the “patent thicket.” Carl 
Shapiro, Navigating the patent thicket: Cross licenses, patent pools, and standard setting, 1 INNOVATION POL. & 
ECON. 119 (2000). 
76 Contracts may constitute the best avenue of recovery to receive sufficient financial incentive.  The US Supreme 
Court has expressed that contracts may be a better avenue of recovery than patent law.  For example, in Quanta, 
the US Supreme Court made clear that LG could raise a contract claim but did not express an opinion on the 
validity of the claim.  Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 US 617, fn. 7 (2008)(stating that “LGE's 
complaint does not include a breach-of-contract claim, and we express no opinion on whether contract damages 
might be available even though exhaustion operates to eliminate patent damages”)(citation omitted).  Contracts 
raises their own problem.  Contracts are often incomplete and AI creators may not foresee how the AI will be 
used or how the AI users may try to escape their contract obligation.  In both Quanta and Bowman, the plaintiffs 
had their direct costumers sign contracts in an attempt to control how their product was used.  In Quanta, LGE 
licensed a patent portfolio to Intel Corporation. The License Agreement “permits Intel to manufacture and sell 
microprocessors and chipsets that use the LGE Patents (Intel Products). The License Agreement authorizes Intel 
to ‘make, use, sell (directly or indirectly), offer to sell, import or otherwise dispose of’ its own products practicing 
the LGE Patents.” Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 US 617, 620 (2008).  In Monsanto, 
“Monsanto sells, and allows other companies to sell, Roundup Ready soybean seeds to growers who assent to a 
special licensing agreement.”  Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013). “And so Monsanto, 
does not face direct competition in the original AI market.77  These models could ensure that 
the creator profits from the second-generation knowledge without having to extend current IP 
rights.  If these models do not incentivize creators, these creators should consider exploiting 
their AIs in-house.  In-house exploitations ensure that an AI-creator can harness the first mover 
advantage78 – a frequently preferred avenue of profiting from IP.79 
Patent and copyright law ignores inventor-author’s cost-benefit analysis because those 
individuals control both costs and benefits.  Instead, the IP system focuses on society’s 
analysis.  Society should grant IP protection for AI-created innovations and works if those 
would not exist without protection and if their existences benefit more than cost society. 
The IP system can incentivize knowledge creation but it cannot incentivize 
unforeseeable leaps in knowledge.  Therefore, the IP system should not grant irrational AI-
creators protection for the second-generation knowledge; nor should the IP system help 
creators who fail to price correctly their invention. 
Some of these alternative business models disappear if the original AI cannot be 
protected.  The next section discusses the issue when non-protected AI are used to create 
second-generation knowledge. 
d. From No Protection to Some Protection 
In some cases, AI-machines may not be protectable.80  Even if they are protectable, some 
creators may not want to protect their AIs through the IP system.  When Congress created the 
IP system, it did not create a self-enforcing right.  Instead, right holders had to enforce these 
rights and pursue alleged trespassers.  These rights are often expensive to enforce.81  Thus, 
some AI-creators may prefer to use trade secret to protect their AIs.82 
 Relying on trade secret creates different issues.  Relying on trade secret decreases 
creators’ ability to profit.  Creators cannot sell their AI without risking the machine being 
copied.  Creators may need to be incentivized to create their AI.  Creators could be incentivized 
by being assigned protection for their second-generation knowledge.  They may be able to 
monetize the AI’s progeny. 
                                               
predictably enough, sells Roundup Ready seed to farmers with a license to use it to make a crop.”  Id. at 1768.  
These contracts reveal a desire to control their IP beyond what patent law authorized.  In both cases, the lawsuits 
arose because the contracts fail to foresee how IP users would attempt to avoid patent liability.  Contracts may 
also be less incentivizing than patent law because they do not allow punitive damages.  AI creator may favor 
patent law because they allow for treble damages for willful infringement.  Under 35 U.S.C. § 284, courts “may 
increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.” In Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse 
Electronics, 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016), the US Supreme Court found that “Section 284 allows district courts to punish 
the full range of culpable behavior. […] Consistent with nearly two centuries of enhanced damages under patent 
law, however, such punishment should generally be reserved for egregious cases typified by willful misconduct.”  
Arguably, these treble damages may be the difference between under and over-incentivizing. 
77 This issue is referred to as the Coase Conjecture.  See fn. 23.  Leasing is one of the ways to avoid the issues 
linked Barak Y. Orbach, The Durapolist Puzzle: Monopoly Power in Durable-Goods Markets, 21 YALE J. ON REG 
67, 120 (2004). 
78 Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-mover advantages, 9 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT J. 41 
(1988)(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of moving first). 
79 Industry surveys show that practitioners prefer first mover advantage over patenting.  See e.g. Richard C. Levin, 
Alvin K. Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson, Sidney G. Winter, Richard Gilbert, & Zvi Griliches. Appropriating the 
returns from industrial research and development. 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 783 (1987); 
Aija Leiponen & Justin Byma, If you cannot block, you better run: Small firms, cooperative innovation, and 
appropriation strategies, 38 RESEARCH POLICY 1478 (2009). 
80 See discussion in fn. 11. 
81 Garry A. Gabison, Government-Sponsored Patent Monetizing Entities, 12 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 229, 
262 (2019)(discussing the enforcement costs of patent rights). 
82 Some innovators prefer to rely on trade secret.  They only patents once their innovations can be reversed 
engineered.  Petra Moser, Innovation without patents: Evidence from World’s Fairs, 55 J. L. & ECON 43 
(2012)(showing that, in the chemical industry, inventors patented more after reverse engineering became easier). 
Furthermore, relying on trade secret enhances the creator’s claim to second-generation 
knowledge.  It avoids issue of foreseeable from first-generation patents.  It may avoid issues 
of originality if second-generation knowledge is considered undistinguishable from the first-
generation AI. 
When the AI is not protectable, creators may not be under-incentivized to create the AI.  
While they might not be able to sell or lease the AI for fear that the technology would be copied 
or become worthless,83 they might decide to exploit it themselves.  Exploiting the second-
generation knowledge becomes one way to monetize the AI.  These AI-creators may need to 
be incentivize to make an AI-machine by granting them protection for the AI-generated 
knowledge. 
This incentive may nonetheless be unnecessary.  First, AI-creators would still enjoy the 
first mover advantage in the second-generation knowledge space. Second, if trade secret is an 
option, creators should not be granted protection for second-generation knowledge for two 
reasons: (1) AI creators could still sell an unduplicable AI; and (2) AI-creators would then be 
able to extend protection to AI-generated IP by not protecting their AIs.  This protection could 
harm more than benefit society because an AI may produce unforeseeable benefits, which 
would never had incentivized AI creators. 
Policymakers may not be able to distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
decision to use trade secret or between anticipated and unanticipated AI progeny.  Protecting 
the second-generation is an inefficient approach to incentivizing AI.  To be efficient, the AI-
creators would have to be rational and form expected belief about the AI’s future work product.  
If these AI-creators were able to anticipate what their AI would develop, they could protect it 
directly.  Extending protection would only reward irrational AI-creators or luck.  It would go 
again the ethos of the IP system. 
3 MACHINE OWNER, MACHINE OPERATOR, AND THE AI MACHINE 
“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and 
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best 
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and 
useful Arts.’”84   
This US Supreme Court’s view may prove complicated in the AI setting.  AI involves 
a number of entities beyond the AI-creator.  To encourage individual efforts requires a delicate 
balance.  This section attempts to answer whether this balance can be reached to improve 
welfare.  This section discusses the claims an AI-owner, an AI-user, and the AI itself may have 
over the AI-created IP.  Many of the issues discussed about AI-creators apply to these other 
claimants.  To avoid repetitions, this section focuses on the more important issues related to 
each claimant. 
a. AI-Machine Owner 
In many settings, machine creator, owner, and operator differ.  This section assumes that the 
second-generation knowledge is protectable.  It investigates whether AI-machine owners 
should be able to claim protection for the AI-generated knowledge.   
A machine owner IP system would make the machine more valuable to owners.  
Assigning owners IP rights would increase demand for AI machines i.e. increased willingness-
                                               
83 Sometimes referred as the Arrow Information Paradox, the technology cannot be sold or discussed without 
having to disclose information about the technology.  Disclosing the information eliminates the commercial value 
of the technology because any potential buyers that receive that information have the necessary knowledge to 
reproduce it.  See Kenneth Joseph Arrow, Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention, THE 
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (1962). 
84 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 558 (1985) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 
U. S. 201, 209 (1954)). 
to-pay and quantity demanded.  This increased demand would increase returns to AI-creators 
on the first-generation knowledge. 
However, a machine owner (or creator) right system would disincentivize users.  By 
assumption, the owner differs from the user.  For the AI to produce any knowledge, the owner 
must cooperate with a user.  This relationship suffer from agency problems.  The agency 
problem occurs because the beneficiary of the work (the owner) differs from the decision maker 
(the AI user).85  This separation leads to a misalignment of incentives: the user would not use 
the AI to create second-generation knowledge at the socially efficient level because the user 
would not (fully) internalize the benefits of his or her work. 
An owner IP system already exists in some jurisdictions.  In the University context, the 
knowledge created within a university environment may belong to the researcher or the 
university by default.  For example, in Austria, Denmark, Finland, and Norway, researchers 
were the default IP right holders86 whereas in Germany, legislation moved away from a default 
researcher ownership toward a default university ownership.87  A study found that assigning 
ownership to the lab owner decreased exploitation incentives.88  This assignment likely has a 
similar effect on creation incentives.89 
Regardless of the default, many universities negotiate those rights.  Under different 
regimes, the institutes and the researchers negotiate different incentive schemes.90  Among 
those, they may discuss bonus scheme to encourage research.  Depending on the situation, lab 
owner may be better off relinquishing the IP to the researcher.91 
In the AI context, an owner would have to address these agency problems.  Regardless 
of the default IP rule, the AI-owner would have to negotiate with and incentivize the AI-users.  
Incentive contracts can take many forms such as outcome based (e.g., royalty or bonuses) or 
effort based (e.g., hourly salary). 
These incentive contracts make the default ownership assignment redundant.  On the 
one hand, if the AI-owner has default ownership, then it will have to negotiate with the AI-user 
to incentivize knowledge creation.  On the other hand, if the AI-user has default ownership, 
then the AI-user has to negotiate with the AI-owner to incentivize access to the machine.   
In other word, regardless of right assignment, an AI-owner has to negotiate with an AI-
user.  Contract remains the best way to assign the profits from AI-generated IP.  This 
assignment depends on the bargaining position of AI-owners and users.  Competition between 
                                               
85 See e.g.,  Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301 
(1983)(discussing the issues associated with separating the decision maker from ownership). 
86 Gustavo A. Crespi, Aldo Geuna, Önder Nomaler & Bart Verspagen, University IPRs and knowledge transfer: 
is university ownership more efficient?, 19 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 627, 629 (2010)(“Some countries 
in Europe (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Norway) traditionally had the so-called professor privilege, 
which gives university employees the IPR to their inventions. Most of these countries recently changed their 
legislation, assigning ownership to the university…”). 
87 Id. 
88 Paola Giuri, Federico Munari & Martina Pasquini, What determines university patent commercialization? 
Empirical evidence on the role of IPR ownership, 20 INDUSTRY & INNOVATION 488 (2013)(discussing the 
different incentives beyond patent exploitation under different regimes and finding that legislative regime that 
grant university ownership of the researchers’ IP are correlated with fewer sales but had no statistically significant 
impact on licensing and spin-off). 
89 Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, The management of innovation, 109 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 1185 (1994) 
(modeling and discussing the incentive impact of different intellectual property right regime and assignments of 
right). 
90 Id. fn. 1. 
91 “Giving property rights to the research unit is optimal when it is more important to encourage the unit’s effort 
to discover than to boost the customer’s financial (and nonfinancial) investment in the research.”  Id. at 1186. 
AI-owners and users affect the bargaining position – not the default rule.92  The next section 
focuses on the AI-users. 
b. AI Machine Operator 
Without the ability to negotiate, comparing an owner IP-ownership to a user IP-ownership, 
their incentives move in opposite direction.  Assigning the IP to the owners incentivizes 
investments in AI-machines.  Assigning the IP to the users incentivizes the exploitation of AI-
machines. 
From an incentive standpoint, assigning AI-users the machine created IP would lead to 
more inventions and works of art.  Like the AI-creator, AI-users could argue that they are the 
proximate cause for the IP.  The AI-users may even be a closer proximate cause because AI-
machines may have substitutes but without the AI-users’ input, the machine would not have 
discovered that invention or created that work.  Regardless of the IP protecting the AI, these 
machines remain tools.  In fact, the AI-user may have reached the same outcome but more 
slowly without the AI. 
Based on current precedents, AI-users may have the strongest claim to the AI created 
IP.93  In the patent context, an AI-user can patent a second-generation invention even if the 
invention was made by using patented tools or through serendipity.94  The use of the AI to 
invention is irrelevant.  Even if the second-generation invention is cumulative, it often is 
patentable.95 
Patentability questions are fact intensive.  Historically, a creative genius was necessary 
to make an invention patentable.96  The US Supreme Court created the “flash of creative 
genius” test.  This test required an inventor to show that an invention was useful and was the 
results of more than incremental steps from constant efforts.97  The inventor had to show its 
creative mind and that something more than normal skills of the profession was applied to 
make the invention.98 
                                               
92 This is specific restatement of the general Coase Theorem.  First discussed in The federal communications 
commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1959) and later illustrate with more examples in The problem of social cost, 3 J. 
L. & ECON. 1 (1960), Ronald Coase laid out that “It is necessary to know […] [the] initial delimitation of rights 
[for without it] there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine them. But the ultimate result (which 
maximises the value of production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work 
without cost”. Id. at 8.   
93 The discussion focuses on AI users who have obtained the AI through legal means such as a sale or a license.  
If the AI user did not obtain the AI legally, then using the AI to create new knowledge raises liability issues.  See 
e.g. Janice M. Mueller, No Dilettante affair: Rethinking the experimental use exception to patent infringement for 
biomedical research tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Donald R. Ware, Research Tool Patents: Judicial 
Remedies, 30 AIPLA Q J 267 (2002). 
94 “Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.”  35 U.S. Code § 103 
(2011)(emphasis added). 
95 The AI-users may not be incentivized to develop cumulative innovation based on the AI because they may not 
be able to exploit it.  Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the shoulders of giants: cumulative research and the patent 
law. 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 29 (1991)(discussing the difficult issue of setting breadth and depth of patents to 
incentivize cumulative innovation). 
96 The flash of creative genius test was formulated in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 
US 84, 91 (1941): “the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius, not merely 
the skill of the calling. If it fails, it has not established its right to a private grant on the public domain.”  
97 David E. Wigley, Evolution of the Concept of Non-obviousness of the Novel Invention: From a Flash of Genius 
to the Trilogy, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 581, 591 (2000). 
98 “Tested by that principle, Mead's device was not patentable. We cannot conclude that his skill in making this 
contribution reached the level of inventive genius which the Constitution (Art. I, § 8) authorizes Congress to 
reward. He merely incorporated the well-known thermostat into the old "wireless" lighter to produce a more 
efficient, useful, and convenient article.” Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 US at 91. 
However, the Copyright Act of 1952 moved away from the flash of genius test in favour 
of the non-obviousness criterion.99  While different, both criteria require that “[m]ore must be 
done than to utilize the skill of the art in bringing old tools into new combinations.”100   
In the AI context, the creative genius test would nullify an AI-user’s claim to second-
generation invention.101  The patenting decision would become a question of fact about the AI-
user’s involvement, input, and creative genius.  Moving away from the creative genius test in 
favour of the obviousness requirement still leaves questions open. 
The obviousness requirement could also nullify the AI-user’s claim.  As discussed, the 
fictional POSITA102 depends on the tools available to him or her and the knowledge base at 
the time of filing.103  Some scholars have argued that technology should affect the knowledge 
base and the POSITA standard.104  Enhancing the POSITA standard to include AI tools could 
make everything more obvious because the AI-user would have to show that this AI-created 
invention was not obvious for others with their own AI-machine.105 
                                               
99 Arthur H. Seidel, The constitution and a standard of patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 5, 5-9 (1966). 
100 Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 US at 89.  The US Supreme Court first interpreted 
the obviousness standard in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 US 1 (1966).  In this case, the Court 
invalidated a patent because the patent claimed protection over a combination of elements where “the differences 
between them and the pertinent prior art would have been obvious to a person reasonably skilled in that art.” Id. 
at 37.  The America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. 112-29., amended the section on non-obviousness but kept the 
main clause:  
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained […] if the differences between the claimed 
invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before 
the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the 
claimed invention pertains. 35 U.S. Code § 103 (2011). 
101 Under the flash of creative genius test, an AI machine makes most discover the outcome of constant and 
incremental efforts.  Automated AIs require little in user input including flash of genius.  Non-automated AIs may 
amount to tools that users deploy to invent.  These tools could be construed as constant sustained effort that 
demand no flash of genius. 
102 Courts have compared “person having ordinary skill in the art” to the fictional “reasonable man” in tort law.  
See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987)(stating that “‘a person having 
ordinary skill in the art’ [is] not unlike the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the law.”); Antici v. KBH 
CORPORATION, 324 F. Supp. 236 (ND Miss. 1971)(stating that “the ‘person of average skill in the art’ under § 
103, who is the patent law equivalent of the ‘reasonable man’ of tort law, is neither a genius nor an expert”).  As 
such, this fictional man changes over time. 
103 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to whom? Evaluating inventions from the perspective of PHOSITA, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 885 (2004)(discussing what the person having ordinary skill in the art knows or should 
know).  Note that PHOSITA stands for a person having ordinary skill in the art and has been used interchangeably 
with POSITA a person of ordinary skill in the art and PSITA a person of skill in the art. 
104 Brenda M. Simon, The Implications of Technological Advancement for Obviousness, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 331 (2013). 
105 Without a non-obvious leap, the innovation may be anticipated.  “Anticipation does not require the actual 
creation or reduction to practice of the prior art subject matter; anticipation requires only an enabling disclosure.”  
See e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 339 F. 3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  Or, the innovation may be 
cumulative but not sufficiently distance from current knowledge base to warrant protection.  See e.g., Kristina B. 
Dahlin & Dean M. Behrens, When is an invention really radical?: Defining and measuring technological 
radicalness, 34 RESEARCH POLICY 717 (2005)(suggesting and testing a different definition of radical innovation 
to determine whether a cumulative invention ought to be patentable).  Even then, AI-users face an uphill battle to 
satisfy the non-obviousness requirement under this enhanced standard.  An invention may be found obvious for a 
number of reasons. “Exemplary rationales that may support a conclusion of obviousness include: 
(A) Combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results; 
(B) Simple substitution of one known element for another to obtain predictable results; 
(C) Use of known technique to improve similar devices (methods, or products) in the same way; 
(D) Applying a known technique to a known device (method, or product) ready for improvement to yield 
predictable results; 
(E) “Obvious to try” – choosing from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable 
expectation of success; 
However, AI could be construed as more than a tool.  Whether an AI-user could patent 
such invention would depend on whether the AI’s invention was “invented” or “discovered”.106  
Individuals cannot protect something occurring in nature.107  An invention must be man-made.  
Courts and policymakers may consider that AIs are more than tools.  Those AIs could be 
compared to nature or sub-human entities.  This more-than-a-tool aspect would negate the 
patentability of second-generation inventions. 
In the copyright context, the AI-users has a stronger claim than creators or owners.  
Authors are assigned the copyright regardless of whether they used a tool.108  Copyright does 
not divest in the tool creator; otherwise, pen or computer manufacturers would have long 
claimed every novel ever written. 
However, the AI’s work product may not be copyrightable.  The U.S. Copyright Office 
has stated that it “will not register works produced by a machine or mere mechanical process 
that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or intervention from a 
human author.”109  While the sweat of the brow doctrine has been rejected, the Copyright Office 
requires an author’s involvement to protect works of arts.  The AI-users cannot let the machine 
work autonomously.  Random and automation are questions of fact and case law does not say 
where the threshold lies on the AI-tool spectrum.110 
                                               
(F) Known work in one field of endeavor may prompt variations of it for use in either the same field or a 
different one based on design incentives or other market forces if the variations are predictable to one of 
ordinary skill in the art; 
(G) Some teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art that would have led one of ordinary skill to 
modify the prior art reference or to combine prior art reference teachings to arrive at the claimed invention.” 
U.S. PATENT & TRADE OFFICE, 2143 Examples of Basic Requirements of a Prima Facie Case of Obviousness 
[R-08.2017], Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (9th ed., 2017), available at 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2143.html  
Users would need to satisfy the teaching, suggestion, or motivation test.  This test specifies that “a patent claim is 
only proved obvious if the prior art, the problem’s nature, or the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in 
the art reveals some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings.” KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 
550 US at 399 (2007). 
106 “[A]ny petitioner that ‘hath . . . invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, . . . or device, or any 
improvement therein not before known or used’ if the board found that ‘the invention or discovery [was] 
sufficiently useful and important’”  Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 US 1, 6-7 (1966) (emphasis 
added). 
107 See e.g., Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013)(holding that 
naturally occurring DNA sequences cannot be patented whereas artificially created DNA sequences are 
patentable). 
108 In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 US 53 (1884), the US Supreme Court extended copyright to 
photographs.  In doing so, the Court looked at the calibration of the camera as “original intellectual conceptions 
of the author.”  Id. at 60.  The calibration was part of the creative process. 
109 The U.S. Copyright Office interprets this to mean that AI would not be granted copyright.  The Compendium 
of U.S. Copyright Office Practices: Chapter 300, at 16, citing id. at 312.3, available at 
https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/chap300/ch300-copyrightable-authorship.pdf . 
110 AI works could come into two flavors: self-improvements and unrelated works.  For self-improvement, the 
AI-users may be able to copyright the new sections of AI software.  However, the AI-users may also have to 
negotiate with AI-creators to commercialize the AI-created work.  For example, assume that the AI-creator writes 
a software intended to create new music.  The AI-user would be able to copyright the music.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) 
(1990).  But, if the music can only be played by the AI and hence the music requires the inclusion of the AI-
original software code to be played, then the subsequent invention would infringe on the original AI copyright.  
The AI-user may attempt to claim fair use.  But the success of a fair use claim depends on “the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and […] the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”  17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).  The AI-user may not 
defeat an infringement claim.  However, copyright offers a narrow protection and as such would not protect the 
original AI-creator from secondary derivative works if the second-generation software was substantially different.  
Copyright does not protect “idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”17 
U.S.C. § 102(b) (1990). 
If protection were to be awarded for the AI’s work, users have a strong claim.  But, if 
AIs were more than tools, their claims disappear.  Instead, AIs may try to claim IP rights for 
themselves.  The next section discusses whether this protection should be awarded to AIs. 
c. Intellectual Property for Non-Humans 
Some AI software are already capable of writing software.111  As tech savvy individuals debate 
the dangers of AI,112 one such machine named Sophia has been granted citizenship in Saudi 
Arabia.113  As a citizen, this machine can own property including human-created patents and 
copyright.  The next step would be for such machines to claim protection over their own 
creations.  Such claim could challenge the definition and boundaries of intellectual property.   
From a policy standpoint, the need to incentivize AI machines is unclear.  Based on the 
current AI systems, they remain machines compliant to user demands.  As such, if 
policymakers assign IP to incentivize knowledge creation, then AIs are a poor assignee.  Even 
if AIs become sentient computers and autonomous, it is unclear whether they will exhibit the 
same incentive needs as humans.114  These machines may not respond to traditional incentive 
mechanisms (i.e. promise of exclusivity, financial rewards, etc.).  As such, the IP system would 
have to change to adapt to AI specific incentive system. 
The current IP system incentivizes inventors and authors.  These individuals respond 
to positive incentives such as the right to exclude others.  They are also deterred by negative 
incentives such as infringement liability.  If the AIs were granted protection and rights over 
their work product, they should also be liable for their infringements.  Only under such a system 
where AIs could internalize the cost of their activities115 would these AIs create knowledge 
creation at the socially efficient level.  However, AIs may not respond to negative incentives 
(e.g., punishment) either.  As such, the broader legal system would have to change to make AI 
liable and adapt to their deterrence system. 
Under the current legal setting, AIs have the weakest claim.  But this may change in 
the future.  Non-human entities can already own property – including intellectual property; 
however, they cannot be the inventor on a patent application116 or the author for a copyright 
                                               
111 See e.g. Fan Long, & Martin Rinard, Automatic patch generation by learning correct code, 51 ACM SIGPLAN 
NOTICES 298 (2016); Tom Simonite, AI Software Learns to Make AI Software, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 18, 2017) 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603381/ai-software-learns-to-make-ai-software/  
112 Maureen Dowd, Elon Musk’s Billion-Dollar Crusade To Stop The A.I. Apocalypse, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 2017) 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/03/elon-musk-billion-dollar-crusade-to-stop-ai-space-x; Peter Holley, 
Bill Gates on dangers of artificial intelligence: ‘I don’t understand why some people are not concerned’, 
WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 29, 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/01/28/bill-gates-
on-dangers-of-artificial-intelligence-dont-understand-why-some-people-are-not-concerned/ (last visited Apr. 18, 
2018). 
113  Cleve R. Wootson Jr., Saudi Arabia, which denies women equal rights, makes a robot a citizen, WASHINGTON 
POST (Oct. 29, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2017/10/29/saudi-arabia-which-
denies-women-equal-rights-makes-a-robot-a-citizen/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). 
114 Andréa Morris, We Need To Talk About Sentient Robots, Forbes Magazine (Mar. 13, 2018) 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andreamorris/2018/03/13/we-need-to-talk-about-sentient-robots/ (last visited May 
11, 2018). 
115 Under the current legal, “robots cannot be sued.”  United States v. Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F. 2d 977 (3rd 
Cir. 1984).  If AI were to reap the benefits of the IP system, they should also face the costs.  Beside the incentive 
system, fairness may also dictate that AIs should fact the cost of infringing if they were to reap the benefit of 
protection.  See e.g., David C. Vladeck, Machines without principals: liability rules and artificial intelligence, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 117, 124 (2014)(discussing the idea that AI can be held liability in the future the way corporations 
are held liable). 
116 In patent law, the term “person” and “inventor” appear throughout the Act.  See e.g., 35 U.S. Code § 102. “The 
term ‘inventor’ means the individual or […] individuals.” 35 U.S. Code § 100 (f).  This has been interpreted to 
mean human inventors.  See e.g., New Idea Farm Equipment Corporation v. Sperry Corporation and New Holland 
Inc., 916 F.2d 1561, fn. 4 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(“ the judge properly recognized that people conceive, not companies”).  
Even under the joint work, an AI would not be able to share patent protection with the user. 
claim.117  AI could be assigned these rights as corporations already are.  But they cannot claim 
these rights because they are not human.118 
Challenges have been made to legally recognize non-humans as humans.  In the Matter 
of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., on Behalf of Tommy, v. Patrick C. Lavery, a nonprofit 
organization advocated on behalf of two captive chimpanzees to grant them habeas relief and 
transferring them from captivity to a primate sanctuary.119  Such a relief would require making 
them “persons.”  The Court of Appeal denied the motion but not without making a number of 
remarks in dicta that could well pave the way for animals (and possibly AI machines) to be 
construed as a person in the future.   
Justice Fahey recognized that person may well be ill defined.  Persons are not just 
entities that have “the capacity or ability . . . to bear legal duties, or to be held legally 
accountable for their actions” and provide the counter example of children.120  Instead, Justice 
Fahey proposes a different test: “we should consider whether a chimpanzee is an individual 
with inherent value who has the right to be treated with respect.”121  Based on this test, animals 
and AIs may well one day be considered persons.  If they are persons, then granting them IP 
right is not far away. 
 However, even if AI could be considered humans, AIs would face other problems to 
protect their inventions and works.  For example, their innovations may be obvious.  The 
POSITA for AI applicants should be AIs.  A claim could be obvious to other AI machines and 
not patentable as such.  The originality in copyright could also bar AI’s work for being 
copyrightable. 
 The next section compares the different claims.  It discusses whether the AI’s work 
should just fall into the public domain. 
4 THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND THE INCENTIVE PROBLEMS 
This section argues that all four knowledge creation participants (i.e. creators, owners, users, 
and AIs) should not be granted IP protection for those inventions or works.  Instead, the IP 
should fall in the public domain. 
a. Comparing Claims 
AIs have themselves made IP more important to incentivize knowledge creation because they 
threaten how inventors or author can profit.  Without IP, inventors and authors can recoup their 
investments by relying on secrecy122 or on the first mover advantage.123  However, AIs have 
threatened both recoupment methods.  First, AIs jeopardize secrecy because they would make 
                                               
117 In copyright law, “original works of authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) has been interpreted to require that the 
work be created by humans.  In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 US 53 (1884), the Court focused 
on the “original intellectual conceptions of the author.” 
118 See e.g., Naruto v. Slater, 888 F. 3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018)(discussing whether a monkey could be the author of 
a photo and finding that it lacked standing on the Copyright laws). 
119 In the Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., on Behalf of Tommy, v. Patrick C. Lavery, &c., et al., Motion 
No. 2018-268 (May 8, 2018 NY Court of Appeals).  In the Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., on Behalf 
of Kiko, v. Carmen Presti et al., Motion No. 2018-268 (May 8, 2018 NY Court of Appeals) available at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/Decisions/2018/May18/M2018-268opn18-Decision.pdf  
120 Id. at 3. 
121 Id. at 5. 
122 Reverse engineer remains a legal strategy to competitors.  The AI itself could be reversed engineer if only 
protected by copyright – and so could its progeny.  Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and 
Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REVE. 1, 17 (2001) (“[V]irtually every court to consider the issue 
has concluded that there is a right to reverse engineer a copyrighted program for at least some purposes.”). 
123 Stuart Graham, et al. High technology entrepreneurs and the patent system: Results of the 2008 Berkeley patent 
survey. 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1255, Table 1 (2009)(finding through surveys that practitioners prefer first 
mover advantage and secrecy over patent in the software industry). 
reverse engineering easier.  Second, AIs has decreased the first mover advantage because AIs 
would increase the innovation frequency.  Once these recoupment methods are not available, 
innovators and authors would turn to IP protection to profit from their work.124   
 Based on this argument, IP protection may be necessary to incentivize knowledge 
creation.  However, favouring one claimant creates incentive problems with the other 
claimants. 
First, granting AI-creators the IP rights disincentivizes the purchase of AI and its use 
to create knowledge.  AI-creators worry about the market for AIs.  A rational AI-creator would 
rather negotiate with the AI-owners – possibly under a license instead of a sale – to ensure that 
their interests are aligned. 
Second, granting AI-owners these rights disincentivizes AI-users.  AI-owners must 
then address these issues through other incentive mechanisms.  Such mechanisms often involve 
contractual negotiations to align owner and user interests.  A rational AI-owners would then 
not care about the right assignment because they have to negotiate with creators for the 
purchase of the AI and with users to incentivize their work. 
Third, granting AI-users these rights over-incentivizes their efforts and could decrease 
societal welfare.  Once invented, AIs simplify the creative process.  This simplification 
decreases the cost of the creative process.  This decrease leads to more inventions and works 
of art.  Inventors and authors keep producing as long as private marginal benefits still outweigh 
the marginal costs; but, society wants them to keep producing as long as societal marginal 
benefits outweigh societal marginal costs.  These two points can differ because inventors and 
authors do not account for the externalities they create.125  In such situation, the system 
incentivizes and protects more knowledge than is socially efficient. 
Finally, a rational AI would not want to be assigned rights to its work product.  Granting 
an AI these rights disincentivizes the users from using the AI because they would be foreclosed 
from using the created knowledge.  In turn, this lack of use disincentivizes owners from 
purchasing the AI.  This decreased demand also disincentivizes AI-creator from creating the 
AI.  Thus, a rational AI would prefer others to be assigned the rights to its work product to 
ensure its existence. 
  
                                               
124 See e.g., Petra Moser, How do patent laws influence innovation? Evidence from nineteenth-century world's 
fairs, 95 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 1214 (2005)(finding that innovators in the chemical industry started to rely on 
patents as a form of protection once reverse engineering became better). 
125 For example, one externality is the impact on cumulative innovations.  Exclusion impede cumulative 
innovations. See e.g. Alberto Galasso& Mark Schankerman, Patents and cumulative innovation: Causal evidence 
from the courts, 130 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 317 (2014)(finding that post-invalidation invalidated patents are more 
likely to be cited as prior art).  However, cumulative innovations can be more beneficial than the original.  For 
example, at the societal level, if the original patent provides a small jump in knowledge from previous innovations 
but block more valuable cumulative innovations, this patent may be socially inefficient.  In patent law, exemptions 
for using other patented invention are limited.  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).  Such exception include the research 
exemption. The US Supreme Court considered this exemption in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 193 (2005) and found that a patented drug can be used during clinical trial without infringing on the patent 
even if the research is not ultimately included in a submission to the Food and Drug Administration.  In copyright, 
“the fair use of a copyrighted work” provides more leniency for cumulative works.  The fair use of a copyrighted 
work includes “such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords […], for purposes such as criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright.”17 U.S.C. § 107.  The fair use doctrine “protects secondary creativity as a legitimate 
concern of the copyright.”  Pierre N. Leval, Toward a fair use standard, 103 HARVARD L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
Table 1: Summary of the Different Options. 
IP ASSIGNEE 
Issues 
CREATOR OWNERS USERS AI 
Current Legal 
Standard 
Few rights Some rights Most rights No rights 
Patent Obviousness 
Problem 
Obvious 
innovations 
flowing from 
previous steps. 
Obvious 
innovations to AI-
enhanced owners 
or researchers. 
Obvious 
innovations to 
AI-enhanced 
researchers. 
Obvious to other 
AI-machines. 
Copyright 
Authorship Problem 
Mechanical 
creation. 
Mechanical 
creation. 
Mechanical 
creation. 
Mechanical 
creation. 
Incentives 
(+) over-incentivized 
(-) under-incentivized 
(/) neutrally-
incentivized 
AI-creators: (+); 
AI-owners: (–);   
AI-users: (–); 
AIs: (/) 
AI-creators: (–); 
AI-owners: (+);   
AI-users: (–); 
AIs: (/) 
AI-creators: (–); 
AI-owners: (–);   
AI-users: (+); 
AIs: (/) 
AI-creators: (–); 
AI-owners: (–);   
AI-users: (–); 
AIs: (/) 
 
Table 1 summarizes the previous discussion.  Depending on the claimant the law would 
either need to be clarified or changed to support their ownership claim over the AI-created 
knowledge.  More importantly, no default rule balances the incentives if negotiations proved 
impossible: every IP assignment leads to under and over incentivizing. 
 Policymakers could approach the problem in different ways.  They could assign the 
right in a way that causes the least amount of incentive distortions.  Policymakers would have 
to weigh the over-incentivization of the assignee against the under-incentivization of the other 
parties.  This balance may be impossible because of the counteracting interests involved.126   
Instead, policymakers may opt to decrease transaction costs between the participants.  
This decrease would encourage negotiation between the parties and lead to the socially efficient 
outcome.  Assigning clear rights help decrease transaction costs.  But according to the Coase 
Theorem, the assignment itself is irrelevant.  The party should be able to reach the socially 
efficient outcome regardless of initial right assignment if transaction costs are zero (or 
sufficiently low).  The initial assignment only affects the bargaining power of each participants. 
However, in a world with transaction costs, the assignment matters.  In the three-party 
example, the AI-creator may never negotiate with the AI-users.  In fact, the AI-user may be 
unknown at the time of the AI sale – making negotiation impossible and increasing transaction 
costs.  Assigning the rights to AI-users or the AI-creators would increase transaction costs 
because it requires these individuals to negotiate when they would not have otherwise.   
In this example, the assignment that leads to the lowest transaction costs is the AI-
owner because AI-owners have to negotiate with both creators and users – regardless of the IP 
assignment.  In more complicated systems, a right assignment based on this principle may not 
be possible. 
 Second, policymakers can assign the property right to the entity least incentivized to 
innovate based on cost-benefit analysis.  At the margin, such an assignment should lead to the 
highest positive impact on the innovation system.  Because the creator already profits via the 
sale of the AI, owners or users may need to be more incentivized at the margin.  Even if the 
creator is not sufficiently incentivized through the sale, it could decide to exploit the AI to 
benefit more.  This option is not available to the other potential assignees.  Furthermore, 
                                               
126 If the AI-creator receives the IP rights, then the AI-owners and AI-users would be respectively under-
incentivized to purchase and create knowledge with the AI.  If the AI-owner receives the IP rights, then the AI-
creator and the AI-users would be respectively under-incentivized to invent an AI and to create knowledge with 
it.  If the AI-users receives the AI, the AI-creator and owners would be respectively under-incentivized to create 
and purchase the AI. 
creators could profit through putting the AI to other use.  Creators may not need to be granted 
protection and assigned the rights to the second-generation knowledge to be incentivized.  
Thus, policymakers may want to focus their attention on the owners and users. 
Third, policymakers can assign the property right to the entity providing the greatest 
innovative input i.e. the “proximate cause”.  In this case, the users have the strongest claims 
because their actions are necessary for the creation of the IP.  As discussed, the AI-creators 
may have had other use in mind for its machine.  So, while they may be a cause-in-fact, they 
are not the proximate cause for the invention or works. 
Fourth, policymakers can assign the property right to the entity with the most control 
over the output.  Policymakers may view AI as a natural resource to be exploited.  Property 
rights over natural resources usually falls within two systems: first possession and dominion 
(i.e. physical control).127  In the AI case, the AI creator’s claim would amount to first possession 
and the AI user’s claim would amount to dominion.  A dominion style rule would focus on the 
exploitation and extraction.  Such rule presents judicial efficiency because it often is easy to 
prove.  
None of these approaches solve the over and under-incentive problems described in 
Table 1.  One solution is to create a new category of protection for AI-assisted inventions and 
works.  Policymakers can play around the depth, breadth, and length of IP to cater to AI.  Such 
AI could have a shorter life128 and have higher filing and renewal fees to avoid over-incentive 
and the protection of socially inefficient inventions and works.  These mechanisms can play an 
important role in discouraging socially inefficient patents.129   
Beside these incentive issues, policymakers have to consider the cost and benefits of 
changing the rules.  Policymakers will have to clarify the patent obviousness standard and 
whether AI should be construed as random or mechanical machines.  Clarifying the rule before 
changing the rule is the first necessary step.  Until then, AI-created knowledge should fall into 
the public domain as argued in the next section. 
b. Public Domain 
Even under the current system, parties have found solutions and contracted around IP issues.  
For example, IBM has opened the use of Watson, its AI, to consumers.130  In doing so, IBM 
does not attempt to claim IP over the knowledge created.  Instead, the users may try to claim 
protection.  But granting protection may not be the solution to the AI-created knowledge. 
This AI-created knowledge should fall into the public domain.  First, every assignment 
creates incentive problems.  Letting this knowledge falls into the public domain does not 
destroy all incentives – it only decreases the governmental created incentives.  While AIs 
decrease the efficiency of secrecy and first mover advantage, AIs have created other means of 
recouping investment from the market.  For example, AIs could increase the efficiency of 
                                               
127 This discussion refers to the basics of possession illustrated in Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (1805).  See e.g., 
Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985)(discussing first possession 
rule of capture and first possession). 
128 Some scholars have already argued that the current copyright protection is longer than necessary to incentivize 
authors.  See e.g., Kristelia A. Garcia & Justin McCrary, A Reconsideration of Copyright's Term, ALA. L. REV. 
(Forthcoming 2019). 
129 See e.g., Gaétan De Rassenfosse & Adam B. Jaffe, Are patent fees effective at weeding out low-quality patents?, 
27 J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT STRAT. 134 (2018)(finding that the value of patents increased after the introduction 
of renewal fees in 1982). 
130 IBM, Getting started with Watson Analytics (Nov. 21, 2017) https://community.watsonanalytics.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/wa_tutorial-3.pdf.  IBM Watson Products and Services, IBM 
https://www.ibm.com/watson/products-services/ (describing the services provided by the Watson AI)(last visited 
Apr. 18, 2018). 
secrecy by making duplication more difficult.131  AIs could also make profiting more efficient 
because these machines could enable better catering and price discrimination,132 which would 
transfer more consumer surplus to the AI-wielder. 
Second, most assignments do not decrease transaction costs.  They only shift the 
bargaining power of each party.  For example, assigning the rights to the AI-owners does not 
decrease the likelihood of a creator holdout: creators may refuse to sell their AI unless the 
owners agree to transfer the whole profits from the AI’s work product and threaten to exploit 
the AI themselves. 
Third, letting this knowledge fall into the public domain increases judicial efficiency.  
For example, the AI-user has currently the strongest claim to the AI-created IP.  However, this 
claim remains a question of fact about the human creation.  The decision will move along a 
spectrum between no-AI-involvement and all user design and all-AI involvement and AI-
design (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Courts may decide to grant an AI-user an IP over an invention or work if the user is 
responsible for 51% of the creative process.  However, this question can be complicated and 
onerous for granting agencies, the parties, and courts to decide.   
Policymakers may find it more efficient to let all AI-created IP fall into the public 
domain.   From a judicial efficiency standpoint, this option would lead to the fewest patent 
filings, copyright claims, litigations, and lowest enforcement costs.  The cost savings could be 
substantial.133  Policymakers may nonetheless want to complement this public domain doctrine 
by creating alternative incentive systems (e.g., incentive prices134) adapting to AI systems.  
Until then, AI-created knowledge should not be protected. 
5 CONCLUSION 
Artificial Intelligence is going to affect every aspect of our lives.  It should be no surprise that 
it would affect Intellectual Property.  Policymakers should get ahead of the problem as AIs are 
already in motion. 
                                               
131 See e.g., Shimon Rothschild, Secure Software by Design, 2018 IEEE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON 
TECHNOLOGIES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (HST). IEEE, 2018. 
132 See e.g., Paul R. Milgrom & Steven Tadelis, How artificial intelligence and machine learning can impact 
market design, No. w24282. NBER, 2018 (discussing the use of computers to better price discriminate) 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24282.pdf. 
133 The cost of enforcing innovation can be difficult to estimate.  Some scholars have attempted to estimate the 
cost of enforcing patents that have not be enforced in the past in the context of patent assertion entities.  The figure 
taunted is in the billions of dollar per year.  See e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from 
NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387 (2014); James Bessen, Jennifer Ford, & Michael J. Meurer, The Private 
and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 34 REGULATIONS 26 (2011).  These costs are debated.  See e.g., David L. 
Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the role of non-practicing entities in the patent system, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
425 (2014).  They show that the cost of enforcement and litigation are non-negligible. 
134 For example, policymakers may opt to establish inducement prizes to incentivize authors and innovators.  See 
discussion on inducement prizes fn. 12. 
More Artificial Intelligence Involvement 
More User Involvement 
Figure 2: AI & User Involvement 
In December 2017, the US Congress and Senate passed a bill entitled the Future of A.I. 
Act.135  In this Act, policymakers commission the Secretary of Commerce to establish the 
Federal Advisory Committee on the Development and Implementation of Artificial 
Intelligence, which was task to finding ways to incentivize development of AI.136   
The Committee should not consider second-generation IP as a valid avenue because of 
the complication it would create for other IP creation participants.  The Advisory Committee 
is to make a report and recommendations within two years of the Act.    
This article discussed whether AI generated IP should be protected and if so, who 
should be the assignee.  If we assume that this IP should be protected, then assigning IP to any 
participants has advantages and drawbacks.  If policymakers favour fewest changes to the 
current system, then innovations could be patented by AI-users whereas works of art would 
fall into the public domain.   
Along the way, this article stumbles along a litany of problems that would require 
amendment or changes because of the advent of AIs.  For example, the POSITA standard may 
need to be adjusted for the involvement of AI in the creative process.  This issue may well need 
to be addressed sooner rather than later. 
This article discussed that policymakers may favour different goals.  They may want to 
decrease transaction costs.  With this aim in mind, the AI-owners may prove to be the better 
assignee.  In general, policymakers may want to consider a whole new IP class for AI-generated 
works.  But they may better serve society by letting the AI-created IP fall into the public 
domain.  After all, patents and copyrights are not the only way for the knowledge creation 
participants to profit and be incentivized.  The next step is to wait for different jurisdiction to 
tackle the problem differently and estimate the impact. 
                                               
135 115th Congress 1st Session H.R. 4625. 
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